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Abstract—With an increasing share of wind power production
in the northern European countries and as a consequence
thereof increasing need of regulating resources an integration
of the northern European regulating power market can be socio-
economic beneficial, especially regarding to the good regulating
capabilities provided by the Nordic hydro power production-
based system. After the successful integration of day-ahead
markets, being the basis for the regulating markets, their is the
next aspired step.
In this paper an integrated northern European regulating
power market is modelled, being based on a common day-
ahead market. Different cases of regulating market integration
are studied in order to estimate a possible socio-economic
benefit of exchanging regulating resources between the northern
continental European and the Nordic system.
Index Terms – Regulating market integration, Regulating re-
source exchange, Reserve procurement, Linear optimisation
model.
NOMENCLATURE
BSP Balance Service Provider
TSO Transmission System Operator
ENSTO-E European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Electricity
UCTE Union for the Coordination of the Transmis-
sion of Electricity
PTU Program Time Unit
NTC Net Transfer Capacity
EMPS EFI’s Multi-area Power-market Simulator
I. INTRODUCTION
THE need for sustainable energy production leads to anincreasing share of wind power production especially
in northern Europe, notably in Denmark and Germany but
also in the Netherlands. This prospectively significant share
of intermittent wind power production results in a rising need
for balancing services in order to ensure a secure system
operation [1]. The Nordic, especially the Norwegian hydro
based power production system has capabilities for offering
such balancing services to continental Europe, being provided
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via the increasing interconnection capacity between the Nordic
and the continental European power system.
With the Electricity Market Directives 96/92/EC and 54/EC
the European Union enforces the contemporaneously process
of the liberalisation and integration of the national Euro-
pean power markets. Regulation 1228/2003 thereby explicitly
addresses cross-boarder issues [2]. There is already huge
progress in coupling and integrating forward, especially day-
ahead markets. Examples here are the common Nordic day-
ahead market, the trilateral market coupling (TLC) between
the Netherlands, Belgium and France or the market coupling
between Denmark and Germany (EMCC). In the case of
integrating regulating power markets, the first steps are taken
by constituting regional cooperations. There still is a long way
to go to achieve an integrated European regulating market,
whereas an integrated northern European regulating power
market would already be an important development. The
integration of regulating power markets will be essential in
order to exchange regulating reserves [3].
There are several studies done on national regulating mar-
kets, mostly investigating price behaviour, forecasting regulat-
ing power prices [4] - [6] and optimising the bidding of market
participants [7], [8]. A rough estimation of the economic value
of exchanging regulating resources between the Nordic system
and continental Europe is done in [9]. In order to estimate
the possible socio-economic outcome of integrating northern
European regulating markets and exchanging regulating re-
sources, in this paper a model of an integrated regulating
market is developed, which is based on a common day-ahead
market clearing. The modelled areas hereby include the Nordic
countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and the
northern European countries the Netherlands and Germany
representing 2008’s state of the system, shown in Fig. 1.
This paper is divided into eight sections. In sections II and
III a short overview on the system which is modelled and on
system balancing is given. Section IV gives an overview of
the current state of regulating market integration in Europe.
Next the developed model is described in section V with
detailed formulations stated in the appendices B to D. To study
the integration of the northern European regulating markets,
different cases are studied in section VI. Their results are
presented in section VII. Finally a conclusion of the paper
is given in section VIII.
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Fig. 1. Geographic overview of the modelled System
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The modelled system, shown in Fig. 1 comprises the Nordic
power system Nordel1 including Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden and the northern part of the continental European
power system UCTE including the Netherlands and Germany.
An overview of the include control areas and the correspond-
ing transmission system operators (TSO) is given in Table I.
For the German TSOs their current and their former names
are stated.
The overall power generation in the Nordic part amounts to
about 400 TWh annually, whereof 170 TWh are produced by
hydro power plants. Still the power generation characteristics
in the Nordic system differ significantly from country to
country. In Denmark the annual power production of about 40
TWh generation is mainly thermal based, containing a huge
share of CHP power plants. It has a rapidly increasing share of
wind power production, which supplies about 20% of the total
annually energy. Finland has an annual power production of
about 80 TWh, where generation is based on a mix of hydro
power production and thermal power production, including
nuclear, hard-coal and gas power plants. In Sweden power
1In July 2009 ETSO’s succeeding organisation ENTSO-E was founded,
with Nordel and UCTE as the regional Nordic and Continental Europe
subgroups. In the paper it is still referred to this systems as Nordel and
UCTE, as also most of the literature include originates from these former
organisations
TABLE I
CONTROL AREAS
No. TSO Abbr. Comment
1 NO1
2 Statnett NO2
3 NO3
4 Svenska Kraftna¨t SWE
5 Fingrid FIN
6 Energinet.dk DK
7 50Hertz Transmission DE1 formerly known as Vatten-
fall Europe Transmission
8 transpower DE2 formerly known as E.On
Transportnetze
9 Amprion DE3 formerly known as RWE
Transportnetze
10 EnBW Transportnetze DE4
11 TenneT NL
generation with about 150 TWh per year is mainly supplied by
hydro power and nuclear power plants whith an equal share. In
Norway with an annual production of about 130 TWh, almost
all the power production is based on hydro power [10].
The continental European power system is mainly based on
thermal generation. The power production in the Netherlands
and Germany sums up to about 740 TWh annually, whereof
the Netherlands have a share of 105 TWh. Here power pro-
duction is based on a mix of hard-coal, gas-fired and oil-fired
power plants, with a substantial share of CHP power plants.
An increasing share is supplied by wind power generation,
which currently is about 3.5% of the total production. The
German system as the biggest part of the model has an annual
production of about 635 TWh. A substantial share is provided
by nuclear and lignite power plants, being approximately 300
TWh per year. The remainder is supplied by a mix of hydro,
hard-coal, gas, oil and other power plants and an increasing
share of wind power production being 40 TWh annually [11]
- [14].
The energy volumes presented here are the total volume
settled in bilateral contracts, future as well as forward markets.
Thereby the shares between these different alternatives differ
quite essential between the northern continental European
areas and the Nordic area. In Germany in the day-ahead market
run by EEX only about 20% of the total energy volume is
settle, whereat via NordPool more than 50% of the energy
volume in the Nordic area is settled.
III. SYSTEM BALANCING
The day-ahead market clearing results into a balance be-
tween the expected electricity production and the expected
consumption. During the real-time operation of the system
there quite likely occurs an imbalance between the actual
production and the actual consumption. As electricity cannot
be stored, the same power has to be produced as is consumed
at any point in time. This system balancing is one of the main
responsibilities of the transmission system operator (TSO). To
be able to balance the system, a TSO needs regulating reserves,
also called balancing services. Those services are provided
3by either producer or consumer, being called balance service
providers (BSP).
Balancing services are divided in different types regarding
to their response time and the type of activation. Due to the
different characteristics of the Nordic and the northern Euro-
pean system there is a difference in the definition of balancing
services in those areas. In the UCTE system balancing services
are divided into primary, secondary and tertiary reserves. Pri-
mary reserves are fast-responding reserves with an activation
time of 30 seconds, which react on frequency deviations in
the system. Secondary reserves are automatically activated
reserves with an activation time of 15 minutes, which react on
the area control error (ACE). They are used to replace activated
primary reserves and restore the nominal system frequency.
In addition there are tertiary reserves, which are manually
activated reserves. Tertiary reserves are used to free activated
secondary reserves [15]. In the Nordic system balancing
services are divided into frequency controlled reserves (FCR),
containing frequency controlled operation reserves (FCNOR)
and frequency controlled disturbance reserves (FCDR) with an
activation time up to 30 seconds, which are automatically acti-
vated reserves, reacting on a system frequency deviation. FCR
equal the primary reserves of the continental European system.
Further on there are fast disturbance reserves (FADR) with an
activation time up to 15 minutes, which are based on the total
imbalance of the Nordic system [16]. A detailed overview of
different balancing services definitions and specifications can
be found in [17].
The provision of balancing services is either mandatory,
contracted bilaterally or done via auctions on a regulating
power market. There are regulating power markets for the
different types of the balancing services. In the regulating
power markets there are auctions for reserve capacity, what
corresponds to the procurement of regulating reserves. The ac-
tivation of regulating reserves during real-time system balanc-
ing corresponds to the auction of regulating energy (regulating
resources), being likewise part of the regulating power market.
An analysis of different regulating power market designs can
be found in [18]. The time basis for clearing the regulating
power markets is the program time unit, which is 15 minutes
in the UCTE and 60 minutes in Nordel.
Primary reserves are essential for the operational security.
In Netherlands their provision is mandatory for units above
a certain capacity [19]. In Germany primary reserves are
procured through a biannual auction [20]. In the Nordic area
they are contracted either bilaterally or through a market for
primary reserves as it was opened in Norway in 2008 [21] &
[16].
It is distinguished between the procurement of reserve
resources and the actual activation of this regulating resources.
As hydro power production has a high regulating capability
due to the rapid ramping ability of hydro power plants,
there are normally sufficient reserve resources available in the
Norwegian system. Thus there is no need to procure them
beforehand. During periods with tight capacity a reserve option
market (RKOM) is run in Norway, what mainly happens in
the winter time. In the Swedish system it is required that all
available reserves are bid into the market, what is somehow
similar in the Finish system. In a thermal system the procure-
ment of regulating reserves is essential. In the Danish system
reserves are contracted bilaterally [22]. The same accounts for
the Netherlands, where this contracting is done annually on a
bilaterally basis, wherewith BSPs are contractually obliged to
bid into the secondary reserve market, what can be done until
one hour before real-time. In Germany the regulating reserve
procurement for secondary reserves is done monthly auction-
based at [20]. In this auction capacity bids as well as energy
bids are specified. The German regulating market for tertiary
reserves is held daily.
IV. INTEGRATION STATE OF EUROPEAN REGULATING
MARKETS
The successful integration of European day-ahead markets,
as it is aspired by the Price Coupling of Regions (PCR)
[23] covering 80% of Europe’s total power production, can
provide experience and a basis in order to integrate European
regulating power markets. In order to exchange such balanc-
ing services an integration of national regulating markets in
necessary to provide a common basis [18].
By now there are proposals from ETSO [24], Nordel [25],
Eurelectric [26], ERGEG [27], Bundesnetzagentur (BNA) [28]
& [29] and Frontier Economices & Consentec [30] suggesting
different approaches for the cross-border exchange of balanc-
ing services, i.e. the integration of regulating power markets.
An overview on these different approaches is likewise given
in [18]. These proposals can generally be divided into two
approaches depending on the balancing service exchanging
parties. In the first approach exchange of balancing services
is done between TSOs and BSPs in neighbouring areas. This
is currently implemented by RTE (France) and some of its
neighbouring countries (Germany, Switzerland, Spain) and
between Germany and Austria, where BSP can provide tertiary
reserves mutually [20]. The second approached constituted the
exchange of balancing services between TSOs, at a different
degree of integration. An exchange of balancing services is
currently implemented between RTE and National Grid (UK),
which only includes the exchange of regulating resources in
the case of available transmission capacity [31]. The recently
constituted grid control cooperation (GCC) in Germany, was
implemented by four subsequent steps each corresponding to a
higher step of regulating market integration [29]. The German
regulating market integration was suggested by studies of Con-
sentec [32] and Lichtblick [33] showing possible savings in
the case of German wide reserve procurement and imbalance
netting. From May 2010 a German wide GCC is enforced by
the BNA [34]. In the Nordic system there is a fully integrated
regulating power market with a harmonisation of balancing
services introduced in March 2009 [25].
In order to exchange balancing services in a European wide
area instead of country wise, the transmission system has to be
considered, taking into account cross-border congestions. Thus
there has to be a trade-off between the day-ahead exchange and
the exchange of balancing services. One solution approach is
to use a joint market model as implemented by Risø in Wilmar
[35], where the day-ahead market and the regulating market
is clear at once, taking into account all system constraints.
4Comment? Realistic?
V. MODELLING
In order to develop a model of an integrated northern
European regulating power market, a generic electricity market
design is assumed. The regulating market is based on a day-
ahead market, using the day-ahead market’s outcome as input
to the regulating market. Further on the day-ahead market
is assumed to be a common northern European day-ahead
market, on which an integrated northern European regulating
market can be based. The markets modelled are assumed to be
perfect markets, neglecting market power issues. As discussed
in the previous section there are different alternatives and
sequences of electricity market designs. Sequence refers to
the temporal order of clearing the markets, e.g. first running
a reserve capacity market and clearing the day-ahead market
afterwards or vice versa. The sequence especially concerns the
knowledge of the day-ahead prices and dispatch when running
the regulating market, particularly when procuring regulating
reserves. In the case of procuring reserves before day-ahead
market clearing an expected day-ahead market clearing would
have to be taken into account, resulting in a stochastic problem.
In the here presented model a deterministic approach is im-
plemented. Thus a sequence is chosen, where at first the day-
ahead market is cleared and subsequent the regulating market
is run. Running the regulating market includes the regulating
reserves procurement and finally the system balancing in real-
time. The chosen time basis for the day-ahead market clearing
is one hour according to NordPool, the APX and the EEX.
As PTU length for the regulating market, i.e. the resource
procurement and the system balancing 15 minutes are chosen
to match the PTU length of the UCTE. In the model the
fast reacting primary reserves are neglected and only slower
reserves are taken into account.
The systematics of the model are shown in Fig. 2. It consists
of the following three subsequent steps: the common day-
ahead market, the regulating resource procurement and the sys-
tem balancing. The common day-ahead market is simulated by
the use of EFI’s Multi-area Power-market Simulator (EMPS)
[36]. The outputs of EMPS are the optimal day-ahead dispatch,
taking into account the unit-commitment, the according area
prices and water values, which are used as inputs to the subse-
quent steps. In the second step regulating resources according
to defined reserve requirements are procured, resulting in a
redispatch of the available generation capacity in order to
fulfil the reserve requirements. This generation redispatch then
is the input to the last step, the real-time system balancing.
In the following subsections V-A to V-C each of these steps
with the according model are described in more detail, with a
discussion of reserve pricing in subsection V-D.
As shown in Fig. 1 the developed model consists of 29 in-
terconnected day-ahead areas. The areas are defined according
to country borders, the geographic distribution of generation
capacity and existing bottlenecks in the transmission system.
Germany is subdivided according to the suggestion given
by [37], [38] and according to areas chosen in [1], [39].
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the subsequent model steps
The subdivision of the Norwegian system takes into account
different water courses in the hydro system. On a second level,
these 29 day-ahead areas are aggregated into 11 control areas,
which are in accordance with the current control areas in the
UCTE [40] and in Nordel2 [16]. A further aggregation of these
control areas into three balancing areas, being Nordel, the
Netherlands and Germany, which complies with the currently
defined control blocks is done on a third level. The system
is modelled in its 2008’s state regarding the installed power
plants, the transmission system, the exchange with neigh-
bouring countries, the power production and consumption. To
model the stochastic power production 40 different inflow and
corresponding wind scenarios covering the years 1951 to 1990
are simulated.
A. Day-ahead market
The day-ahead market is modelled with EMPS [36]. It
is an mid- and long-term optimisation model determining
the socio-economic optimal dispatch of electricity generation
on a weekly basis assuming perfect market behaviour with
a time horizon of several years. Weeks can be split into
several subsequent periods, by which a hourly resolution of
the optimisation process is achieved.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the modelled system is split
into different areas in which production and consumption is
aggregated. The transmission lines connecting the areas are
modelled by net transfer capacities (NTC) and linear losses,
not distinguishing between AC and DC transmission lines.
EMPS was developed for the Nordic system, including
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, thus taking into
account hydro based power generation. As there is no real
cost for the water, but there is a limited amount of water in the
hydro reservoirs, its long term utilization has to be optimised.
2According to Nordel’s System Operation Agreement [16] the Nordic area
is one control area, with a common Nordic merit order list of regulating bids.
Just as the areas defined the day-ahead market clearing by NordPool [41],
the Nordic system can be split into areas during real-time system operation,
taking into account congestions. In this case the activation regulating bids
can deviate from the common merit-order list. The areas during real-time
operation can, but does not need to match the day-ahead areas. The division
chosen in this model is according to 2008’s division.
5Thereto EMPS contains a detailed water course description of
the hydro power production. Within the optimisation the water
values for the hydro reservoirs are determined. They represent
the opportunity cost of hydro power production using the water
stored in a hydro reservoir. A further explanation of the water
value approach is given in [36]. For the hydro power plants,
the water values of the according hydro reservoirs are used
as the marginal production cost. With these marginal costs
for hydro power production, employing a detailed, rule based
reservoir draw-down model the optimal dispatch for the hydro
power production is determined.
Besides the hydro power generation, thermal power plants
are modelled, which are described by a marginal production
cost and start up- & shut down costs [42]. Wind power
generation is modelled as a fixed input to the system, being
defined by the installed wind power generation capacity and
nominal wind power production. The nominal wind power
production is based on wind speed scenarios gained from
reanalysis data as utilized in [1]. In EMPS consumption is
defined by curves based on real measurements [19], [43] -
[46] and the possibility of including demand elasticity and
temperature dependency. Exchange to neighbouring countries
is modelled by a scheduled energy exchange [47] rather than
a price-dependent exchange.
For a common northern European day-ahead market clear-
ing, the EMPS is expanded to the Netherlands and Germany
by including further areas and extending the transmission
system, resulting in the model as it is shown in Fig. 1.
Both countries are modelled as thermal systems only. Thereby
the thermal generation is modelled in two different ways,
either as scheduled production, for which a production profile
during an year is given or as dispatchable production. The
division between scheduled and dispatchable production is
shown in Table II. Some of the hard coal, gas- & oil fired
power plants are used for district heating thus having a partly
fixed production profile. The available dispatchable generation
capacity is modelled in the form of single power plants with
individual marginal production and start- & stop costs.
TABLE II
POWER PLANT TYPES MODELLED IN THE NORTHERN CONTINENTAL
EUROPEAN AREAS
Non-dispatchable generation Dispatchable generation
Nuclear Hard-coal
Lignite Gas-fired
CHP Oil-fired
Biomass
Photovoltaic
Wind
Hydro
Some results of the common day-ahead market clearing are
presented afterwards. Fig. 3 shows the area prices for the 40
different inflow and wind scenarios in the form of percentiles
for two selected areas. The percentiles give the probability
of prices lying below the indicated value. The depicted areas
are Southern Norway, which has a high installed hydro power
production capacity and the Amprion area, which is a thermal
area with the highest consumption share in Germany. The
area price curves clearly show the characteristics for each
of the areas. In the hydro area (Fig. 3a) there is a high
variation between the different percentiles, which indicates a
price dependency on the inflow scenario. There is no high
variation of the single percentiles though. However in the
thermal area the variation between the percentiles is not high,
but the variation of each percentile. This indicates a high price
variation between the different periods during a week (e.g.
peak, off-peak, weekend). In both areas the prices are around
50 EUR/MWh in average, which matches the average price
of the dispatchable thermal power plants. This shows that the
marginal production costs of the thermal power plants to a
large extent determine the area prices in the Nordic System.
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Fig. 3. Percentiles of area prices in a hydro and a thermal area
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show a detailed dispatch of generation
units during one week in the Amprion area. Here only the
dispatchable generation units are plotted. The colour indicates
the marginal production cost of the individual units, from blue
being cheap units up to the red, the most expensive ones. In
each of the blocks ten units are aggregated. The marginal cost
stated for the block is the one for the most expensive unit in
the block. The plot shows the increasing marginal production
costs due to higher production during peaking periods. Due to
the consideration of start up costs and the minimum generation
capacity of thermal units in the optimisation problem, some
of the more expensive units still run during off-peak periods
even though the area price is below their marginal production
cost, shown in Fig. 5a. Further on the available regulating
reserve resources are plotted in Fig. 5b, showing that there is
a huge difference between peak and off-peak hours. During
peak-hours the available regulating reserve resources are quite
few, resulting in the necessity to procure further regulating
resources, what is done in the next step.
In Fig. 6 the aggregated day-ahead dispatch of the trans-
mission lines between the Nordic system and Northern con-
tinental Europe is depicted. The transmission lines include
the Denmark-West Germany interconnection, the NorNed, the
Baltic and the Kontek HVDC-cables. The plot shows the
percentiles of the annual duration curve of the transmission.
It can be seen that the exchange strongly depends on the
scenario, i.e. the inflow to the Nordic system. In approximately
40% of the time there is free transmission capacity on the
lines, providing the possibility of exchanging up- as well as
downward regulating energy. During the rest of the time either
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Fig. 4. Generation dispatch of Amprion during week 3
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Fig. 5. Generation dispatch of Amprion - Analysis
only up- or downward regulating energy can be exchanged
between the Nordic and the northern continental European
area.
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Fig. 6. Day-ahead dispatch of transmission between Nordic and Northern
continental European system
B. Reserve procurement
Given the day-ahead market clearing, in the second step, as
shown in Fig. 2, required regulating reserves are procured.
This is done by a redispatch of the generation units. The
approach of reserve procurement done in this model is dif-
ferent from the reserve capacity markets run in the northern
European areas, as described previously in section III. By
running the reserve capacity markets, generation capacity is
detracted from the day-ahead market beforehand and procured
for system balancing, ensuring that enough generation capacity
is available during real-time system operation. As perfect
market behaviour is assumed in this model, it is assumed
that all available generation capacity is bid into the markets,
the day-ahead market as well as the regulating power market.
Thus it differ if generation capacity is withdrawn from the
day-ahead market beforehand or if this generation capacity is
procured as regulating reserves afterwards. The only difference
in procuring the regulating reserves after the day-ahead market
clearing is that in this case the marginal generation capacity
is always chosen in order to provide regulating reserves. If
the regulating reserve procurement before day-ahead market
clearing, the procurement has to be based on an expected day-
ahead market outcome, as discussed previously. Thus it is not
ensured that the marginal units are chosen in order to provide
the regulating reserves. The sequence chosen in this model
can be seen as the socio-economic most beneficial approach,
what is an idealized reserve procurement, probably resulting
in a to low reserve procurement cost estimation.
The reserves being procured comprise up- and downward
regulating reserves, but spinning reserves only in the case of
thermal power plants. The definition of spinning reserves used
throughout this paper is depicted in Fig. 7. There is a dis-
tinction between hydro and thermal units providing reserves.
For hydro units it is assumed that their start up costs can be
neglected and that they do not have a minimum production
capacity. Thus their full production capacity can be used as
regulating reserves and the units do not need to be started in
order to provide regulating reserves. However thermal units
do have start up costs and a minimum production capacity.
Thus only units that are started up, i.e. producing above their
minimum production capacity can provide reserves. They can
provide reserves up to their maximum production capacity.
Further on downward regulating reserves can only be provided
down to the level of the minimum production capacity as
indicated in Fig. 7 and not down to zero as it is the case
for hydro units.
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Fig. 7. Definition of spinning and non-spinning reserves
In order to define the required regulating reserves the areas
defined in EMPS are aggregated according to the current con-
trol areas as described previously. Further on three balancing
areas are defined. Reserve requirements are then defined for
the control areas, the balancing areas and the total system. The
reserve requirements for the single control areas are shown
7in Table III. These requirements are based on actual values
for the areas, which can be found in [20], [19] and [16]. The
values chosen here are the requirements for the fast disturbance
reserves (FADR) in the Nordic system and the requirements
for secondary reserves in the Netherlands and Germany. In
Norway the requirements are defined for the whole country
instead of the three control areas.
TABLE III
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN MW
NO1 NO2 NO3 SWE FIN DK
Up 520 560 365 175
Down -520 -560 365 175
DE1 DE2 DE3 DE4 NL
Up 640 830 1000 540 300
Down -400 -590 -725 -330 -300
The regulating reserve procurement is modelled with a
linear optimization problem. A detailed formulation of the
model can be found in appendix B. Below this model is
explained.
The aim of the reserve procurement is to change the given
day-ahead dispatch in a way to allocate sufficient regulating
reserves according to the defined reserve requirements rKk , r
K
k ,
rBb , r
B
b , r
T , rT , see appendix A. These reserve requirements
are defined in equation 11 to 14, where the sum over all
regulating resources provided by thermal and hydro plants
situated in a control area, a balancing area or in the total
system has to be higher or equal than the required reserves.
Examples for different reserve requirements in balancing areas
as well as the total system are given further below in the case
study analysis.
In order to fulfil the reserve requirements the day-ahead
dispatch has to be changed, which is done by a redispatch of
the generating units. Two examples of such a redispatch are
explained shortly hereafter. Sketches of them are shown in Fig.
8 for the procurement of upward regulating resources and in
Fig. 9 for downward regulating resources. In these examples
unit 1 is the cheaper and unit 2 the more expensive one.
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Fig. 8. Upward regulating resource procurement
In the first case before the reserve procurement, as shown
in Fig. 8a, there are not sufficient upward regulating reserves
available. To fulfil the requirements unit 2 has to be started
up. Due to the minimum production capacity unit 2 has to
be started up at least to the minimum capacity resulting in
a decrease of production on unit 1, see fig. 8b. This results
in increased production costs due to the higher marginal
production costs of units 2 compared with unit 1 and additional
start up costs due to the start up of unit 2.
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Fig. 9. Downward regulating resource procurement
In the second case before the reserve procurement, as shown
in Fig. 9a there are not enough downward regulating resources
available. This periodically happens during off-peak periods,
where some of the dispatchable generating units are still in
operation and operate at minimum production capacity to
avoid additional shut down and start up costs. To procure
additional downward regulating reserves one of the units has to
be shut down, which here is unit 2, see Fig. 9b. This shut down
results in a increased production of unit 1 providing sufficient
regulating reserves. In this case the cost for procuring the
required resources contains the additional shut down costs for
unit 2 and an actual reduction of the production costs due to
lower marginal production costs of unit 1 compared with unit
2.
The redispatch for hydro units is defined by equation 3
with the production limitations in equation 4, where yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
is the generation dispatch of the hydro unit after the reserve
procurement. The available regulating reserves provided by
hydro units for upward regulation are
(
yhydh − yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
)
and
for downward regulation are
(
yhyd
P
h,ω,τ − yhydh
)
. A minimum
production capacity for hydro plants is defined as yhyd
h
, which
normally is zero, but can be negative to represent pumping
capabilities of a hydro power plant.
The redispatch for thermal units is defined in equation 5.
Equation 6 to 10 are necessary in order to include the start up
costs of thermal power plants in a way to be solved in a linear
optimisation problem. A detailed description of the approach
can be found in [42]. ∆↑xthg,ω,τ and ∆↓x
th
g,ω,τ define relative
values of provided upward respectively downward regulating
reserves. In order to determine the provided reserves, those
values have to be multiplied by the free dispatchable capacity
of the actual thermal power plant
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
. Equation
9 defines the start up of a thermal power plant between the
PTUs (τ − 1) and τ . Equation 10 defines the whole problem
as a round-coupled problem, i.e. the units start up state at the
begin of a week are assumed also to be start up state at the end
of the week. Thus equations 9 and 10 result in the temporal
connection between the PTUs.
During the resource procurement a change of the transmis-
sion dispatch is not allowed. Thus the production balance in
each individual day-ahead area has to be kept, defined by
equation 2. In addition to the possible redispatch of thermal
and hydro units, rationing of demand and shut down of
scheduled production units is added in order to keep the linear
problem feasible. Rationing can be compared to anticipated
curtailment of demand in order to maintain the operational
security during peak periods. Shut down of lignite or other
8base-load plants can be necessary during off-peak periods as
well.
The linear problem is solved for a whole week including all
of the 674 PTUs. The problem is defined to be deterministic,
assuming the generation dispatch, area prices and water values
to be known for the whole week.
The objective of the linear optimisation problem is the min-
imisation of the total redispatch cost. The objective function
for CPω (y
∗) is defined by equation 1. In order to determine
the total costs, the marginal costs of redispatching a unit
are defined by equations 25 to 28. For the thermal units
these marginal redispatch costs are based on the marginal
production costs of the unit and the area price. They are
increased respectively decreased by 5%. For hydro units the
marginal redispatch costs are based on the water values and
the area price. An cost increase is only done for the thermal
units in order to reduce the procurement of regulating reserves
provided by them and subsitute it by reserves from hydro units
instead. Without such an increase the marginal units of both
types would have the same marginal costs after the day-ahead
market clearing, whereas it would not make a difference by
which units the regulating reserves are provided. However in
reality it is seen, that provision of regulating reserves from
hydro units is preferred. Thus the increase is a rough emulation
of the regulating reserve procurement behaviour in reality.
C. System Balancing
In the final step the system is balanced in real-time. As
electricity is not storable, the production and consumption of
energy has to be kept in balance during real-time operation
of the transmission grid, what is done by activating regulating
reserves. The activation of regulating reserves corresponds to
the acceptance of energy bids in the regulating power market.
In order to achieve the socio-economic best outcome, these
bids have to be activated in the order of their bid prices, taking
into account remaining transmission capacities after the day-
ahead market clearing.
A model of the system balancing is implemented as a linear
optimisation problem. The detailed formulation of the model
can be found in the appendix C. Input to the system balancing
model are the generation dispatch after the resource procure-
ment and results from the day-ahead market clearing, including
the transmission dispatch, area prices and water values. A
further input is the imbalance of the system. The system
imbalance consists of different parts like the load forecast
error, hour-to-hour production & consumption changes, un-
planned outages and the wind power production forecast error.
In the model the imbalance only includes a load forecast error
and a wind forecast error, which are represented by recorded
imbalance scenarios of 2008 for the Netherlands and Germany
[43] - [19] as well as recorded imbalance scenarios of 2007
for Norway and Sweden [48]. As there is a difference between
the PTU length in the UCTE and Nordel, the imbalances
of Nordel are conerted to a 15 minute resolution to have a
matching PTU length. The recorded imbalance scenarios are
only available for the whole control areas, however the system
balancing model is based on the individual 29 day-ahead areas
to include the available transmission capacities after day-ahead
market clearing. Thus the imbalances are distributed by a share
according to the ratio of total annual demand of the area
to total annual demand in the control area. This results into
imbalances for all the individual areas.
The aim of the system balancing is to equal electricity
production and consumption in each individual area, includ-
ing the exchange of electricity between the areas, taking
into account the real-time imbalances. The system balance
is defined by equation 16 for each area. Included are the
possible change in thermal power production, the possible
change of the transmission on the lines, the according change
of transmission losses, the possible change of hydro power
production, rationing of demand and shut down of production.
The overall sum of those has to equal the imbalance in the
according area consisting of the load forecast error and the
wind forecast error.
As mentioned previously, during system balancing the day-
ahead transmission dispatch can be changed. The actual real-
time transmission is defined in equation 18 with the according
transmission losses in equation 17. The predefined constants
δBl ∈ {0, 1} define for each of the lines, if transmission is
allowed to be changed during system balancing. This gives the
possibility defining whether a line is available for exchanging
balancing energy or not, in order to be able to define different
regulating market integration levels.
The activated hydro regulating reserves are defined as
∆↑y
hydB
h,ω,τ ∆↓y
hydB
h,ω,τ , which are determined in equations 19
for upward regulation and 20 for downward regulation re-
spectively. They have to be positive and less or equal to the
available reserve for each hydro unit.
The activated thermal regulating reserves are defined in
equations 21 to 24. Hereby it is distinguished between
spinning reserves ∆↑y
thBs
g,ω,τ and ∆↓y
thBs
g,ω,τ and non-spinning
reserves ∆↑y
thBt
g,ω,τ and ∆↓y
thBt
g,ω,τ , as explained previously.
Spinning reserves are the reserves available after the resource
procurement, as shown in Fig. 7. Non-spinning reserves equal
all further generation capacity of dispatchable thermal units.
Non-spinning reserves are shown in Fig. 7 likewise. Non-
spinning reserves are included in the system balancing model
to make all dispatchable thermal generation capacity available
for system balancing. The difference for the utilization of
spinning and non-spinning reserves is their activation price,
which is discussed further down below.
The system balancing’s objective is to minimize the socio-
economic costs of activating regulating reserves. The accord-
ing objective function for CBω,τ
(
yP
)
is stated in equation 15.
The linear problem is solved for each PTU individually as
there are no temporal dependencies defined, such as ramping
or the start up and stopping of units. In addition to the
activation of regulating reserves, rationing of demand and shut
down of production is defined in the system balancing as well.
These can be compared with curtailment of consumption or
the shut down of excess wind production during real-time
operation of the system.
9D. Regulating reserve pricing
In order to estimate the cost for the real-time system bal-
ancing the regulating reserves have to be priced. As discussed
above in section IV there are only few researches done on
estimating or forecasting regulating prices, but none for the
determination of actual marginal costs of regulating reserves.
As the objective of the system balancing model is a socio-
economic optimal activation of regulating reserves, the prices
of the regulating reserves used in this paper are based on
the marginal production costs of the reserve providing units.
The determination of the regulating reserve prices can be
found in equations 29 to 34. These are very rough estimates
of marginal regulating reserve prices. For hydro units the
marginal regulating reserve prices are based on the water
value and the area price, being increased or decreased by 10%
for upward respectively downward regulating resources. For
spinning thermal units the marginal regulating reserve prices
are based on the marginal production costs of the regulating
reserve providing units and the area price, being increased
or decreased by 50% for upward respectively downward
regulating resources. The difference between the increase of
10% for hydro units and 50% for thermal units additionally
enforces the utilization of hydro regulating reserves instead of
thermal ones. To provide all dispatchable thermal capacity for
balancing the system in addition to spinning, reserves non-
spinning reserves are defined. There are no start up or mini-
mum production requirements on the non-spinning regulating
reserves, however these issues are included in the pricing of
the non-spinning regulating reserves. The inclusion is done
by adding or substracting related start up cost to respectively
from the marginal regulating reserve price. This increases the
prices quite substantially, which results into utilization of non-
spinning reserves in exceptional circumstances only.
Rationing is priced at 10000 EUR/MWh during resource
procurement as well as system balancing. The shut down of
other than dispatchable production is done at 0 EUR/MWh
also during resource procurement as well as system balancing.
VI. CASE STUDIES
To test the model and evaluate the possible benefit of the
integrating regulating markets several cases are defined. The
cases studied in this paper represent a step wise integration
of the northern European regulating markets, distinguishing
between a system wide exchange of regulating energy and a
system wide procurement of regulating resources.
As the basis for the cases studied, two different years are
chosen, a wet and a dry one. This refers to the inflow of the
Nordic hydro system. An overview of these years is given in
Table IV. It can be seen that there is a 40% difference in inflow
to the hydro system. Additionally there is 25% less wind power
production in the dry year. These differences impact on the
overall operation of the system, which is shown by the net
energy export to continental Europe during a wet year and the
net energy import from continental Europe during the dry year.
Further on it also has an impact on the day-ahead dispatched
production of the thermal generation in continental Europe
which is substanially higher in a dry year, probably resulting
in less available reserves.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON BASIS YEARS
Wet Dry
Storable & Non-storable Inflow (TWh) 244.5 146.1
Wind power production (TWh) 74.93 56.1
Net Exchange Nordel - UCTE (TWh) 8.46 -8.39
Production dispatchable thermal generators (TWh) 287.5 319.6
For both years, different steps of regulating market in-
tegration are defined, reaching from the current state with
no integration up to full integration of regulating markets
including system wide regulating reserve procurement and the
system wide exchange of regulating resources. The different
cases are defined as follows:
a) Case I: is chosen to represent the current state of the
system before the integration of the single German regulating
markets, as described in section IV. Regulating reserves have
to be procured in each control area itself. There is no possi-
bility of exchanging regulating resources between Nordel and
UCTE, no exchange possibility between UCTE’s control areas,
but exchange possibility between the control areas in Nordel.
b) Case II: represents the state of the system after
integrating the regulating markets of all the four German
control areas as described in [29]. The model is the same as
in Case I except that the exchange of regulating resources is
allowed between the four German control areas.
c) Case III: represents the state of integration of balanc-
ing markets, when regulating resources can be exchanged in
system wide, but regulating reserve procurement still has to
be done in each single control area.
d) Case IV: allows the procurement of 25% of required
regulating reserves for each control area in its according
balancing area and the system wide exchange of regulating
resources.
e) Case V: additionally allows the system wide procure-
ment of 25% of the required regulating reserves for each
control area.
In this paper an amount of 25% of required regulating re-
serves to be procured outside the control area or the balancing
area respectively is chosen. As suggested by UCTE [49] and
included in its Policy [15] an amount of maximum 33% of the
required secondary reserves is allowed to be procured outside
the control area. A substantial share of the required reserves
are necessary to be procured in the control area to preserve
the operational security. As the model presented in this paper
there does not check for available transmission capacity during
the reserve procurement process yet, a lower share compared
to the UCTE requirements [15] is chosen.
VII. RESULTS
The common day-ahead market is run for 40 different inflow
and wind speed scenarios. A wet and a dry year are chosen as
the basis for the reserve procurement and the system balancing
for the previously defined cases. In this section the results of
those cases are presented and discussed.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the details of two chosen areas
being Southern Norway and the Amprion area respectively.
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The plots show case V for the wet year. The 34944 PTUs for
a generic year of 364 days are plotted.
In the upper diagrams of both figures the prices in the areas
are depicted. The plotted prices are the real-time balancing
price, the day-ahead area price and for Southern Norway as it
is a hydro area the water value. For Southern Norway it can be
seen that the day-ahead area price lies around the water value.
The real-time balancing price is spread around the area price
in a certain band corresponding to the pricing method of the
reserves discussed previously. The real-time balancing price is
the marginal regulating reserve price of the marginal regulating
reserve activated. During summer prices drop down to nearly
zero. This happens due to excess inflow to the system and
due to low demand resulting in shut down of production, what
corresponds to spillage in the hydro system. In the Amprion
area, a thermal area, the day-ahead area price and the real-
time balancing price are plotted. Likewise in the hydro area
the balancing prices are spread around the area prices in a
certain band according to the previous regulating reserve price
definition. As already discussed for the results of the day-
ahead market clearing, it can be seen that the variation of
prices during a short period is much higher in the thermal
area than in the hydro area. This also results into a higher
variation of balancing prices in the thermal area. The drop
of prices during summer is not observed in the thermal area.
However during the last weeks and the first week of the year
a drop of prices can be spotted. Reason for this price drop is
the low demand during Christmas holidays. Further on there
are some spikes in the balancing prices. These are the times
when activation of non-spinning reserves occurs.
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Fig. 10. Result Southern Norway, Case V, Wet Year
In the lower diagrams in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 operational
values of the areas are shown. These area the imbalance
in the area, the available spinning upward and downward
regulating reserves and the actual activated regulating reserves
in the area. In the Amprion area additionally the non-spinning
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Fig. 11. Result Amprion, Case V, Wet Year
regulating reserves are plotted. As all the hydro power plants
can provide regulating reserves, there is an high amount of
regulating reserves available in Southern Norway, which shows
the good regulating reserve providing capabilities of the hydro
system. The actual system imbalance in Southern Norway is
much less than the activated regulating reserves in this areas
indicating the export of regulating resources. In the Amprion
area the situation of regulating reserves is much tighter. Not
only spinning upward reserves are quite low and just according
to the required volume. Also the availability of downward
regulating reserves is quite low periodically, especially during
low load periods, as can be seen during the late summer and
during the Christmas time. Looking at the relation between
the imbalance and the actual activated regulating reserves, it
can be seen that the actual imbalance is higher. This indicates
the import of regulating resources from other areas.
Fig. 12 shows the difference between the day-ahead trans-
mission dispatch and the actual transmission after the system
balancing including the exchange of regulating reserves. The
transmission depicted is the aggregated exchange between
the Nordic system and northern continental Europe, which
includes the West Denmark-Germany interconnection and the
NorNed, Baltic and Kontek HVDC-cables. Shown are the
transmission duration curves for the wet and the dry year. It
can be seen that the duration curves before and after system
balancing are approximately the same, what shows that the
total exchange of energy is nearly constant. The effect of
balancing the system is a smoothing of the duration curves and
a reduction of the times where the exchange is at minimum
or maximum. This indicates the capability of the cables to
exchange regulating reserves. Further on the plots shown in
Fig. 12a for the wet year and in Fig. 12b for the dry year
show a small shift of the duration curve after system balancing
compared to the day-ahead dispatch. The right shift in Fig.
12a indicates a net export of regulating energy from the
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TABLE V
RESERVE PROCUREMENT AND SYSTEM BALANCING RESULTS IN A WET AND A DRY YEAR
Reserve procurement System balancing
Cost Rationing Shut down Redispatch Cost Upward Downward Net Gross Rationing Shut down
Year Case regulating regulating exchange exchange
Me GWh GWh GWh Me GWh GWh GWh GWh GWh GWh
V 49,81 0,015 56,62 2736 62,00 3185 -3327 348 2200 0 0,681
IV 70,71 0,015 80,27 3900 60,98 3185 -3327 353 2197 0 0,344
wet III 91,92 0,555 167,7 4140 60,22 3185 -3328 354 2194 0 0,119
II 91,92 0,555 167,7 4140 96,00 3991 -4116 0 0 0 0,131
I 91,92 0,555 167,7 4140 180,7 5865 -5990 0 0 0,036 18,63
V 88,12 3,225 14,28 3062 74,58 3284 -3418 -912,7 1962,6 0 0,121
IV 110,8 3,225 21,67 4269 74,10 3284 -3419 -903,6 1956,9 0 0
dry III 436,1 34,22 50,10 4435 73,69 3284 -3419 -901,7 1956,5 0 0
II 436,1 34,22 50,10 4435 113,5 3946 -4054 0 0 0,036 0
I 436,1 34,22 50,10 4435 206,9 5829 -5936 0 0 0,325 12,68
Nordic system, which corresponds to a net export of upward
regulation in the wet year. In the dry year there is a left shift,
indicating a contrarily behaviour in a dry year.
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Fig. 12. Duration curve transmission dispatch Nordel-UCTE
In Fig. 13 the difference between the day-ahead trans-
mission dispatch and the actual transmission after system
balancing is depicted. As above this is done for the aggregated
exchange between the Nordic system and northern continental
Europe. This difference can be interpreted as the exchanged
regulating resources. During the dry year shown in Fig. 13b
there is an exchange of regulating resources between 2.5 GW
of upward regulation to -2 GW of downward regulation during
the whole year with no significant differences between the
seasons. In the wet year shown in Fig. 13a the exchange of
regulating resources is between about 3 GW of upward regu-
lation and -2 GW of downward regulation. In this case there
is significant difference between the season. During summer
there is mostly no export of upward regulating resources. Due
to the high inflow to the reservoirs, the day-ahead prices in
Southern Norway, as depicted in Fig. 10, as well as all the
Nordic system drop to nearly zero. Thus there is already full
export to northern continental Europe during the day-ahead
dispatch. This results in no available transmission capacity for
an additional export of upward regulating energy during the
whole summer of this wet year.
Table V shows a summary of all the above described cases.
The results are divided into the reserve procurement and the
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Fig. 13. Regulating resource exchange Nordel-UCTE
system balancing. The results for reserve procurement for case
I to III are equal as the procedure of reserve procurement is
the same here. Comparing them to case IV there is a decrease
in the necessary redispatched energy of about 165 GWh in
dry year and 240 GWh in the wet year which comes with a
significant reduction of the procurement costs. The difference
between these both cases is the ability to procure parts of the
required regulating reserves in the balancing areas, which a
control area is situated in, instead of procuring all required
regulating reserves in the control area. The main reduction
of redispatched energy is achieved in Germany. This step
can be compared with the recent integration of the German
control areas. In [32] and [29] the savings due to German
wide procurement are estimated to be around 100Me, which is
much more than calculated by this model with approximately
20Me per year for the wet year. In a dry year the procurement
cost are significantly higher. The reason for this is the drastic
increase of rationing during the resource procurement resulting
in a huge share of the procurement costs.
With the implementation of a system wide possibility of re-
source procurement the redispatched energy can be decreased
additionally by approximately 30% in the wet as well as the
dry year. With this further reduction of redispatching energy
comes a further reduction of the procurement costs, which
are comparable with the previous step, being about 20Me per
year.
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Analysing the rationing and shut down during the reserve
procurement, a difference can be seen between a wet and a
dry year. Rationing during reserve procurement happens in a
case when there already is high load near to the total installed
generation capacity. Then even when taking into account all
available generation capacity, there are not enough reserves
available. In order to fulfil the reserve requirements parts of
the load have to be curtailed, which happens at a high price.
Rationing is no big issue in a wet year as there are sufficient
generation resources. There is significant rationing in dry years
though. The rationing only occurs in the northern continental
European areas even though its reason the difference in inflow
occurs in the Nordic areas. The higher rationing is caused
by a export of energy from continental Europe to the Nordic
system on average in the dry year. This results in a higher
utilization of the dispatchable thermal generation capacity in
northern continental Europe. Thus less reserve resources are
available in the northern continental European areas. With a
system wide reserve procurement the rationing can be decrease
significantly.
In reality, the TSO comes in a quite difficult position if
a choice must be made between operation with insufficient
reserves and rationing of demand or load shedding. In theory,
from an economic point of view, the amount of reserves should
be chosen such that the marginal cost of the reserves equals the
expected marginal outage costs. So if the amount of reserves is
optimal with a reserve cost of 50 to 100e/MWh, this amount
should obviously be reduces if the cost suddenly increases to
10000e/MWh, indicating that load shedding should not be
used to avoid marginal violations of the reserve requirement.
In practice, reserve requirements are based on more technical
criteria, which are treated as absolute constraints. The ultimate
consequence of this is, that load shedding is necessary if there
is no other way to satisfy these constraints, and this is the
approach taken in the model.
At the shut down during the reserve procurement production
of base load power plants like nuclear or lignite is decreased,
which is covered by starting up more expensive ones like hard
coal. It is done as nuclear and lignite power plants cannot
provide reserve resources, but dispatchable power plants are
needed to provide the required resources. This applies for
upward as well as downward regulating resources. The shut
down is only done in northern continental Europe too. It is
higher during a wet year, when there is net import of energy
to northern continental Europe. A reduction by about 30% can
be achieved by a system wide reserve procurement.
Analysing the difference between the studied cases in the
system balancing, the main difference occurs between cases
I-III. This corresponds to the different steps of exchanging
regulating energy. In case I exchange of regulating energy
between the German control areas is not allowed whereas this
is allowed in case II. This results in a significant decrease
of balancing costs by approximately 50% and a reduction
of the activated regulating resources by approximately 30%.
The reduction of reserves being activated is the result of
netting the imbalances of the different areas. The reduction
of the balancing costs includes the activation of cheaper
regulating resources and the previously mentioned overall
lower activation of regulating resources. The step from case I
to case II can also be compared to the recent integration of the
German regulating power markets. In [33] and [29] according
savings of 100Me are estimated, which are comparable with
the savings calculated by this model. In case III exchange
of regulating energy in the whole system is allowed. With
that comes a further reduction of the balancing costs and
the activated regulting resources. Netting of the total system
imbalances results in reduction of activated regulating reserves
by approximately 20%. The balancing costs can be reduced
further by 30%. Looking on the exchange of regulating re-
sources between the Nordic system and northern continental
Europe it can be seen that in an integrated regulating market
30% of the regulating resources are imported to continental
Europe. The net exchange of regulating resources depends if
it is a wet or dry year, being positive in a wet year, which
corresponds to a net export of upward regulating resources.
In a dry year the net export is negative. Between cases III-
V there are no significant differences which shows that the
different methods of reserve procurement do not affect the
system balancing.
Due to the procurement of reserve there mostly are enough
regulating reserves available in the system. Regarding ra-
tioning, it only occurs in the case when there is no exchange of
regulating energy allowed between the German control areas
during the wet year. During the dry year there also is some
rationing in the second case, what happens due to the tighter
generation situation. By exchanging regulating energy in the
total system rationing can be prevented completely. The shut
down of production during real-time system balancing happens
more often than rationing. It can be seen that the amount of
shut down production can also be decreased significantly by
exchanging regulating energy in the total system.
The above presented results are in accordance with estimates
of Frontier Economics, which estimated in their 2009 study
[50] a possible additional socio-economic benefit of 5.4Me
to 15.9Me per year in the trade of balancing services by
the reservation of 50MW of exchange capacity, taking prices
of France the UK, Germany and the Netherlands as a basis.
Likewise A. Abbasy et al. in [9] estimated an additional socio-
economic benefit of exchanging balancing services between
northern continental Europe and the Nordic system at about
80Me.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper a model is developed which can represent an
integrated northern European regulating market, being based
on a common northern European day-ahead market clearing.
It arises that in the Nordic system ample regulating reserves
are normally available, due to the good regulating capability
of the hydro power production, which constitutes a high
share of power production in the Nordic system. Due to the
characteristics of the thermal-based system in the northern
continental European area it is necessary to procure upward
as well as downward regulating resources. In this paper it is
suggested to procure parts of the required regulating reserves
in the Nordic system and exchange regulating resources system
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wide taking into account available transmission capacity from
the day-ahead market.
With different defined cases a stepwise integration of the
northern European regulating markets is studied. A compar-
ison with the recent integration of the German regulating
markets is done to test the model’s consistency. It is shown
that by procuring reserves in the system wide the necessary
redispatch can be reduced 30%, what indicates that there are
ample regulating reserve available in the Nordic system. The
activation of regulating reserves can be reduced by 20% due to
netting of the imbalances in the system. Further on one third
of the activated regulating resources is exchanged between the
Nordic system and the northern continental European system.
The socio-economic benefit of procuring regulating reserves
system wide and exchanging regulating resources depends on
the costs of the regulating reserves. In this paper the costs of
regulating reserves are rough estimates, comparing the results
with the recent integration of the German regulating markets
[29] shows consistency though. The reduction of operation
costs is therefore tentative, however it is shown that there
are good possibilities of exchanging regulating resources and
estimating their amount.
The installation of further intermittent generation capacity
like wind power production results in an increased necessity
for regulating reserves. As shown in this paper the Nordic,
especially the Norwegian hydro based electricity production
can provide parts of these regulating reserves. In order to
exchange regulating resources between the Nordic countries
and continental Europe an integrated regulating market is
needed. Modelling such an integrated regulating market, which
is based on a common day-ahead market clearing, shows
that there is a possible socio-economic benefit in exchanging
regulating resources.
APPENDIX
A. Notation
The notation used throughout the paper is stated below.
a) Indicators:
∗ Day-ahead market
P Resource procurement
B System balancing
↑ / ↓ Upward / downward
¯ / Maximum / minimum
b) Sets and indexes:
a ∈ A Single areas defined in EMPS
k ∈ K Control areas
b ∈ B Balancing areas
h ∈ H Hydro plants with Ha, Hk being subsets of hydro
plants situated in areas a or k respectively
g ∈ G Thermal plants with Ga, Gk being subsets of
thermal plants situated in areas a or k respectively
l ∈ L Transmission lines with Ltoa , Lfra being subsets
of lines transmitting to and from the area a
ω ∈W Weeks
τ ∈ T Quarter hours during a week
c) Functions:
CPω (y
∗) Cost function of reserve procurement
CBω,τ
(
yP
)
Cost function of system balancing
d) Water values and area prices:
va,ω , pa,ω Water value and day-ahead price in each area
e) Thermal generation:
yth
∗
g,ω,τ Day-ahead dispatch of ther-
mal plants
yth
P
g,ω,τ , ∆↑y
thP
g,ω,τ , ∆↓y
thP
g,ω,τ Redispatch of thermal plants
during resource procurement
∆↑y
thBs
g,ω,τ , ∆↓y
thBs
g,ω,τ Secondary up- and downward
regulating of thermal plants
in real-time balancing
∆↑y
thBt
g,ω,τ , ∆↓y
thBt
g,ω,τ Tertiary up- and downward
regulating of thermal plants
in real-time balancing
ythg,ω, y
th
g,ω
Maximum and minimum gen-
eration capacity of thermal
plants
cthg , s
th
g Marginal cost and start up
cost of thermal plants
↑cth
P
g,ω,τ , ↓c
thP
g,ω,τ , s
thP
g,ω,τ Marginal redispatch cost and
starting cost of thermal plants
in resource procurement
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↑c
thBs
g,ω,τ , ↓c
thBs
g,ω,τ Marginal up- and downward
regulating costs of thermal
plants for secondary reserve
↑c
thBt
g,ω,τ , ↓c
thBt
g,ω,τ Marginal up- and downward
regulating costs of thermal
plants for tertiary reserve
xthg,ω,τ , ∆↑x
th
g,ω,τ , ∆↓x
th
g,ω,τ Per unit start up and per unit
up- and downward provision
of thermal plants
f) Hydro generation:
yhyd
∗
h,ω,τ Day-ahead dispatch of hydro
plants
yhyd
P
h,ω,τ , ∆↑y
hydP
h,ω,τ , ∆↓y
hydP
h,ω,τ Redispatch of hydro plants
during resource procurement
∆↑y
hydB
h,ω,τ , ∆↓y
hydB
h,ω,τ Up- and downward regulat-
ing of hydro plants in real-
time balancing
yhydh , y
hyd
h
Maximum and minimum
production of hydro plants
↑c
hydP
h,ω,τ , ↓c
hydP
h,ω,τ , s
thP
g,ω,τ Marginal redispatch cost of
hydro plants
↑c
hydB
h,ω,τ , ↓c
hydP
h,ω,τ , s
thB
g,ω,τ Marginal up- and downward
regulating costs of hydro
plants
g) Transmission lines:
t∗l,ω,τ , t
B
l,ω,τ Day-ahead dispatch and real-time transmis-
sion of lines
tl, tl Maximum and minimum transmission limits
αl, δBl Linear losses and availability in balancing of
transmission lines
d∗l,ω,τ , d
B
l,ω,τ Transmission losses in day-ahead dispatch
and real-time transmission
h) Rationing shutdown:
yrat
P
a,ω,τ , y
ratP
a,ω,τ Rationing during reserve procurement and
in real-time balancing
ysh
P
a,ω,τ , y
shB
a,ω,τ Generation shutdown during reserve pro-
curement and real-time balancing
i) Resource requirements:
rKk , r
K
k Up- and downward reserve requirements in each
control area
rBb , r
B
b Up- and downward reserve requirements in each
balancing area
rT , rT Up- and downward reserve requirements in the
total system
j) Regulating demand:
e˜a,ω,τ , w˜a,ω,τ Demand forecast and wind forecast error
in each area
Following the models for the reserve procurement and
the system balancing are described in detail.
B. Resource procurement
k) Objective function:
∀ω ∈W :
CPω (y
∗) = min
{∑
τ∈T
[∑
a∈A
(
∆yrat
P
a,ω,τ · 10000−∆ysh
P
a,ω,τ
)
+
∑
g∈G
(
∆↑yth
P
g,ω,τ · ↑cth
P
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
P
g,ω,τ · ↓cth
P
g,ω,τ + s
thP
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
h∈H
(
∆↑y
hydP
h,ω,τ
· ↑chyd
P
h,ω,τ
−∆↓yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
· ↓chyd
P
h,ω,τ
)]}
(1)
l) Constraints:
∀a ∈ A, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :∑
g∈Ga
(
∆↑yth
P
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
P
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
h∈Ha
(
∆↑y
hydP
h,ω,τ
−∆↓yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
)
+∆↑yrat
P
a,ω,τ −∆↑ysh
P
a,ω,τ = 0
(2)
∀h ∈ H , ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
= yhyd
∗
h,ω,τ
+ ∆↑y
hydP
h,ω,τ
−∆↓yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
(3)
yhyd
h
≤ yhydP
h,ω,τ
≤ yhyd
h
(4)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
yth
P
g,ω,τ = y
th∗
g,ω,τ + ∆↑y
thP
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
P
g,ω,τ (5)
yth
P
g,ω,τ = y
th
g,ω
· xthg,ω,τ + ∆↓xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(6)
∆↑xthg,ω,τ + ∆↓x
th
g,ω,τ ≤ xthg,ω,τ ≤ 1 (7)
sth
P
g,ω,τ ≥ 0 (8)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T/ {1}:
sth
P
g,ω,τ ≥ sthg ·
(
xthg,ω,τ − xthg,ω,τ−1
)
(9)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W :
sth
P
g,ω,τ ≥ sthg ·
(
xthg,ω,1 − xthg,ω,max(T )
)
(10)
∀k ∈ K, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
rKk ≤
∑
g∈Gk
∆↑xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
+
∑
h∈Hk
(
yhyd
h
− yhydP
h,ω,τ
)
(11)
rKk ≤
∑
g∈Gk
∆↓xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
+
∑
h∈Hk
(
yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
− yhyd
h
)
(12)
∀ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
rT ≤
∑
g∈G
∆↑xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
+
∑
h∈H
(
yhyd
h
− yhydP
h,ω,τ
)
(13)
rT ≤
∑
g∈G
∆↓xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
+
∑
h∈H
(
yhyd
P
h,ω,τ
− yhyd
h
)
(14)
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C. System balancing
m) Objective function:
∀ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
CBω
(
yP
)
= min
{∑
τ∈T
[∑
a∈A
(
∆yrat
B
a,ω,τ · 10000−∆ysh
B
a,ω,τ
)
+
∑
g∈G
(
∆↑y
thBs
g,ω,τ · ↑cth
B
s
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ · ↓cth
B
s
g,ω,τ
+∆↑y
thBt
g,ω,τ · ↑cth
B
t
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
B
t
g,ω,τ · ↓cth
B
t
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
h∈H
(
∆↑y
hydB
h,ω,τ
· ↑chyd
B
h,ω,τ
−∆↓yhyd
B
h,ω,τ
· ↓chyd
B
h,ω,τ
)]}
(15)
n) Constraints:
∀a ∈ A, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :∑
g∈Ga
(
∆↑y
thBs
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ + ∆↑y
thBt
g,ω,τ −∆↓yth
B
t
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
l∈Lfra
(
tBl,ω,τ − t∗l,ω,τ
)
−
∑
l∈Ltoa
(
tBl,ω,τ − t∗l,ω,τ
)
+
1
2
∑
l∈Lfra ∪Ltoa
(
dBl,ω,τ − d∗l,ω,τ
)
+
∑
h∈Ha
(
∆↑y
hydB
h,ω,τ
−∆↓yhyd
B
h,ω,τ
)
+∆↑yrat
B
a,ω,τ −∆↑ysh
B
a,ω,τ = e˜a,ω,τ + w˜a,ω,τ
(16)
∀l ∈ L, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
dBl,ω,τ ≥
∣∣tBl,ω,τ · αl∣∣ (17)
tl ≤ tBl,ω,τ ≤ tl, for δBl = 1
tBl,ω,τ = t
∗
l,ω,τ , for δ
B
l = 0
(18)
∀h ∈ H , ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 ≤ ∆↑yhyd
B
h,ω,τ
≤ yhyd
h
− yhydP
h,ω,τ
(19)
0 ≤ ∆↓yhyd
B
h,ω,τ
≤ yhydP
h,ω,τ
− yhyd
h
(20)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 ≤ ∆↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ ≤ ∆↑xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(21)
0 ≤ ∆↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ ≤ ∆↓xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(22)
0 ≤ ∆↑yth
B
t
g,ω,τ ≤ ythg,ω − yth
P
g,ω,τ −∆↑xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(23)
0 ≤ ∆↓yth
B
t
g,ω,τ ≤ yth
P
g,ω,τ −∆↓xthg,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(24)
D. Reserve pricing
o) Resource procurement:
∀a ∈ A, h ∈ Ha, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
↑c
hydP
h,ω,τ
= max (va,ω , pa,ω,τ ) (25)
↓c
hydP
h,ω,τ
= min (va,ω , pa,ω,τ ) (26)
∀a ∈ A, g ∈ Ga, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
↑cth
P
g,ω,τ = max
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
· 1.05 (27)
↓cth
P
g,ω,τ = min
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
/1.05 (28)
p) System Balancing:
∀a ∈ A, h ∈ Ha, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
↑c
hydB
h,ω,τ
= max (va,ω , pa,ω,τ ) · 1.1 (29)
↓c
hydB
h,ω,τ
= min (va,ω , pa,ω,τ ) /1.1 (30)
∀a ∈ A, g ∈ Ga, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
↑c
thBs
g,ω,τ = max
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
· 1.5 (31)
↓c
thBs
g,ω,τ = min
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
/1.5 (32)
↑c
thBt
g,ω,τ = max
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
· 1.5 + s
th
g
yth
g,ω
(33)
↓c
thBt
g,ω,τ = min
(
cthg , pa,ω,τ
)
/1.5− s
th
g
yth
g,ω
(34)
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